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I Introduction
For nearly a century, minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) was
considered per se illegal' under § 1 of the Sherman Act.2 Minimum RPM
results from an agreement between a manufacturer and a dealer to set a
price below which the dealer cannot resell the manufacturer's product.3 In
2007, the United States Supreme Court, in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. ,' decided that the per se rule would no longer
apply, and that RPM would be subject to the rule of reason.5 In contrast to
the per se rule, the rule of reason requires the fact finder to weigh all
aspects of the challenged practice to determine if it is "an unreasonable
restraint on competition.",6 In response to Leegin, the Maryland General
Assembly amended the Maryland Antitrust Act' in 2009, hereinafter
referred to as the "Maryland RPM prohibition," to prohibit per se the use of
1. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911) ("But
agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the destruction of
competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and void.").
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (prohibiting "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations").
3. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007)
(defining minimum RPM as 'a vertical agreement between a manufacturer and its
distributor to set minimum resale prices").
4. See id. at 882 (finding that the rule of reason is the appropriate standard of review
for vertical price restraints).
5. See id (applying the rule of reason to vertical price restraints such as RPM).
6. Id. at 885 (quoting Cont'l TNV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49
(1977)).
7. See MD. CODE ANN., Com. LAW § 11-201 (West 2010) (setting forth the provisions
of the Maryland Antitrust Act).
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RPM.8  The Maryland RPM prohibition is the first and so far only state
legislation "expressly rejecting the application of Leegin to state law."
9
Circumstances will likely arise where RPM would be found lawful in
every state-except Maryland. Because virtually all courts consult federal
antitrust precedent when interpreting state antitrust laws,' 0 courts will
interpret state antitrust laws in accordance with Leegin and adopt the rule of
reason as the standard applicable to RPM. Because the burden of proof
under the rule of reason for an antitrust plaintiff is very high, uses of RPM
analyzed under the rule of reason post-Leegin will likely be upheld in all or
almost all cases."'
This Note demonstrates that although federal law does not preempt the
Maryland RPM prohibition, the Maryland statute regulates commerce
occurring wholly outside the state in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause. It begins by examining a hypothetical but nonetheless probable
situation in which an internet dealer located outside Maryland sells a
product subject to manufacturer-imposed RPM to a Maryland consumer
over the Internet. The Maryland Attorney General or a private plaintiff
subsequently brings suit against the manufacturer for violating the
Maryland RPM prohibition. In response, the manufacturer argues that the
Maryland statute is unconstitutional because it both is preempted by
Leggin's interpretation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and contravenes the
dormant Commerce Clause.
In light of the Court's decision in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland,'12 Leegin's interpretation of § 1 of the Sherman Act does not
preempt the Maryland RPM prohibition because it does not "stand[] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress [in enacting the Sherman Act]."'" The Maryland
8. See MD. CODE ANN., Com. LAW § 11-204(b) (LexisNexis 2009) ("[A] contract,
combination, or conspiracy that establishes a minimum price below which a retailer,
wholesaler, or distributor may not sell a commodity or service is an unreasonable restraint of
trade or commerce.").
9. Michael A. Lindsay, State Resale Price Maintenance Laws After Leegin,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2009, at 2.
10. See Richard A. Duncan & Alison K. Guernsey, Waiting for the Other Shoe to
Drop: Will State Courts Follow Leegin?, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 173, 173-74 (2008) (discussing
the nature of state antitrust laws).
11. See infra Part III (discussing why RPM uses analyzed under the rule of reason will
likely be upheld in all or almost all cases).
12. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1978) (finding that a
Maryland law requiring price reductions to be extended uniformly was not preempted by
§ 2(b) of the Robin son-Patman Act).
13. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989).
13
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RPM prohibition as applied to the Internet, however, violates the dormant
Commerce Clause because it forces manufacturers to take into account the
Maryland law when deciding whether or not to use RPM in states where the
practice might be found lawful.'14  The Maryland RPM prohibition also
disrupts the national economy by creating a compliance nightmare for
manufacturers selling their products at the national level .'1
5
Part 11 provides background information regarding RPM and its
treatment under the law. Part III explains the assumption that RPM will be
found permissible under the rule of reason articulated in Leegin in all or
almost all cases. Part IV evaluates the hypothetical manufacturer's
preemption claim. Part V evaluates the hypothetical manufacturer's
dormant Commerce Clause argument. Part VI discusses more generally,
whether it is appropriate for state antitrust laws to differ substantively from
federal antitrust laws. Part VII concludes that the Maryland RPM
prohibition, while not preempted by Leegin's interpretation of the Sherman
Act, violates the dormant Commerce Clause and disrupts the national
economy by forcing manufacturers to adapt their business models to
inconsistent state and federal antitrust laws.
HI. Background
A. Resale Price Maintenance Generally
1. Resale Price Maintenance Defined
Minimum RPM is a vertical price restraint imposed by a manufacturer
on its dealers that establishes a minimum price at which the dealers may
resell the product. 16 Dealers are guaranteed a markup, or profit margin, on
each sale of the manufacturer's product as a result. 17 The immediate effect
is to eliminate intrabrand price competition-price competition among the
14. See infra Part V (discussing why the Maryland RPM prohibition violates the
Commerce Clause).
15. See infra Part VI (discussing why the Maryland RPM prohibition disrupts the
national economy).
16. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 131-32
(6th ed. 2007) (describing the nature of RPM agreements). For the remainder of the Note,
unless otherwise distinguished, RPM refers to minimumn RPM.
17. See JOSEPH P. BAUER & WILLIAM H. PAGE, 2 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 12.2
(2002) ("The assured mark-up ... at the retailer level, which results from the resale price
maintenance program, helps to preserve the. ... mark-up at the seller level.").
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manufacturer's dealers selling the same brand. 18  Conversely, interbrand
price competition-price competition among manufacturers of different
brands selling the same category of product-is heightened.'
2. The Incentive to Use Resale Price Maintenance
Manufacturers want to use RPM for three reasons: (1) it encourages
dealers to offer product-specific services, such as product demonstrations;
(2) it eliminates the potential for "free-riding" in the market; and (3) it
facilitates market entry. The dealers' guaranteed profit margin induces
dealers to provide product-specific services to compete with rival dealers.2
These services can increase demand for the manufacturer's product and
overall sales,2 ' improving the manufacturer's position vis-A-vis rival
manufacturers.2
Absent RPM, discount dealers may "free-ride" on "full service"
dealers who provide product-specific services 23 and thereby, "capture some
of the increased demand those services generate."2 Consumers can learn
about a manufacturer's product by visiting a "full service" dealer that offers
product-specific services25 or by taking note when a dealer with a reputation
for selling high-quality goods carries the product.2 If the consumer can
18. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007)
("A single manufacturer's use of vertical price restraints tends to eliminate intrabrand price
competition; . ... )
19. See id. (discussing how RPM can increase interbrand competition).
20. Roger D. Blair, Jill Boylston Herndon, & John E. Lopatka, Resale Price
Maintenance and the Private Antitrust Plaintiff, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 657, 698 (2005) (noting
that product-specific services "include product-specific information from knowledgeable
salespeople (often tailored to a consumer's individual needs), product demonstrations,
consumer trial (e.g., test drives of automobiles), and thle like").
21. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 376-77 (2d.
ed. 2009) (discussing how RPM agreements can be used to achieve the desired level of
product-specific services).
22. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890 ("[T]his in turn encourages retailers to invest in
tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts that aid the manufacturer's position as
against rival manufacturers.").
23. See Benjamin Klein, Distribution Restrictions Operate by Creating Dealer Profits:
Explaining the Use of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan, 7 Sup. CT.
ECON. REV. 1, 6 (1999) (discussing the nature of "classic dealer free-riding").
24. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007).
25. See Klein, supra note 23, at 6 (providing an example of classic "firee-riding").
26. See Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and
Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. EcON. 346, 347-49 (1984) (discussing how consumers'
15
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purchase the same product at a lower price from a discount dealer that has
neither invested in product-specific services nor developed a reputation for
selling quality goods, the "full service" dealer will lose sales to the discount
dealer, reducing its incentive to provide product-specific services.2
Because RPM standardizes the price of the manufacturer's product at the
dealer level, it prevents "free-riding" by prohibiting the discount dealer
from "undercutting the service provider."
2 8
Finally, if a manufacturer wants to introduce its product in a new
market, it can use RPM to facilitate market entry. The manufacturer can
use the restraint "to induce competent and aggressive [dealers] to make the
kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the
distribution of products unknown to the consumer.",
29
B. Resale Price Maintenance Under the Law
1. The Per Se Rule Versus the Rule of Reason
Although § 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "[ejvery contract,
combination .. , or conspiracy. ... in restraint of trade or commerce, 3 the
Court has interpreted § 1 to proscribe only unreasonable restraints .3 '1 To
determine whether a restraint unreasonably restrains trade, a court
32traditionally applies either the per se rule or the rule of reason. RPM was
subject to the per se rule until 2007 33 when the Court rejected application of
the per se rule and applied the rule of reason.3
perception of quality can lead to free-riding).
27. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891 ("[T~he high-service retailer will lose sales to the
discounter, forcing it to cut back its services to a level lower than consumers would
otherwise prefer.").
2 8. Id.
29. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
3 1. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-68 (1911) (interpreting the
Sherman Act to proscribe only unreasonable restraints on trade).
32. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 16, at 47 ("To determine
whether an agreement unreasonably restrains competition, courts traditionally have applied
one of two methods of analysis, depending on the nature of the agreement at issue.").
33. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911)
("But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the
destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and
void.").
34. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877. 882 (2007)
1116
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The per se rule applies to a practice that "facially appears to be one
that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output" rather than "one designed to 'increase economic efficiency
and render markets more, rather than less, competitive."'0 5 A practice
subject to the per se rule is irrebuttably presumed unreasonable "without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm [it has] caused or the business
excuse for [its] use."36 The per se rule is reserved for practices "that ..
would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of
reason."3
7
The rule of reason is the predominant standard applied in cases
brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act.3 Under the rule of reason, the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that a restraint has a significant
anticompetitive effect.39 If the plaintiff meets its initial burden, the burden
shifts to the defendant to produce procompetitive justifications for the
restraint.4 If the defendant can produce such evidence, the plaintiff must
show that the procompetitive effects could be achieved by less restrictive
means. 4 1  Ultimately, the purpose of the rule of reason is to determine
whether the challenged practice's anticompetitive effects outweigh its
procompetitive justifications.4 In the context of vertical nonprice
restraints, unless the antitrust defendant has market power, it is very
difficult for the plaintiff to meet the initial burden of proof.4 3 As a result,
(finding that the rule of reason is the appropriate standard of review for vertical price
restraints).
35. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (quoting United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,441 n.16 (1978)).
36. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
37. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886-87.
38. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) ("[There is
a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard .... 1)
39. See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting
that the rule of reason requires the plaintiff to prove anticompetitive effect).
40. See id ("Once [the plaintiffs] initial burden is met, the burden of production shifts
to the defendants, who must provide a procompetitive justification for the challenged
restraint.").
41. See id (requiring the plaintiff to "prove either that the challenged restraint is not
reasonably necessary to achieve the defendants' procompetitive justifications, or that those
objectives may be achieved in a manner less restrictive of free competition").
42. See Cont'1 T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977) (requiring
courts applying the rule of reason to balance the restraint's procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects).
43. See Peter Nealis, Per Se Legality: A New Standard in Antitrust Adjudication
Under the Rule of Reason, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 370 (2000) (discussing the plaintiff's high
burden of proof associated with the rule of reason).
17
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vertical nonprice restraints subject to the rule of reason under § 1 of the
Sherman Act are routinely upheld."4
2. Resale Price Maintenance from Dr. Miles to Leegin
The per se rule applicable to RPM for nearly a century had its origins
in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.45 There, the Supreme
Court held a manufacturer's agreement with its dealer on the minimum
price below which the dealer could not resell the manufacturer's product to
be per se illegal.4 Dr. Miles, a manufacturer of proprietary medicines, sued
Park, a wholesale drug company, for tortious interference with contract.4
Park defended by arguing, among other things, that the restrictions in Dr.
Miles's contracts setting the minimum resale price for Dr. Miles's product
were void as against public policy.48  The Court agreed with Park,
characterizing Dr. Miles's resale price restrictions as a restraint on
alienation 49 that was contrary to public policy and void.50
In 1937, however, at the height of the Depression, Congress passed the
first of two Fair Trade Amendments to amend the Sherman Act to allow
states to make an independent determination whether to allow RPM."1 The
44. See infra Part III (discussing how the rule of reason has been applied to vertical
nonprice restraints).
45. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911)
("But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the
destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and
void.").
46. See id (declaring all vertical price restraints illegal per se).
47. See id. at 394 (discussing the nature of Dr. Miles's complaint). Although Dr.
Miles did not bring suit under the antitrust laws, the per se rule applied to Dr. Miles's price
restrictions became the predominant standard used to determine whether a vertical restraint
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (interpreting Dr. Miles as prohibiting per se vertical price restrictions).
48. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 394 (discussing the nature of Park's defense).
49. See id. at 404 (characterizing Dr. Miles's practice of setting the resale prices of its
goods as a restraint on alienation).
50. See id. at 408 ("[A]greements or combinations between dealers, having for their
sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the
public interest and void.").
5 1. See 6 EARL W. KINTNER & WILLIAM P. KRATZKE, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
§ 43.19 (1986) (discussing the Fair Trade Amendments). Congress wanted to protect small
business from the use of "loss-leaders." Id. "Loss-leaders" are "good~s] that [are] priced
aggressively in order to induce customers to come in the door, where it is then anticipated
that they will purchase other goods as well."). PHILLIP E. AP.EEDA & HERBERT HovENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW T 742(f), at 248-50 (3d ed. 2008).
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Miller-Tydings Act52  provided that RPM agreements between
manufacturers and their dealers would not violate the Sherman Act if
permitted by state law. i 195 1, the Supreme Court held, in Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 54 that a manufacturer could not enforce
RPM agreements against nonsignors--dealers who choose not to sign the
RPM agreement.55 The next year, Congress passed the McGuire Act, 
56
which, among other things, permitted states to create a right of action for
57manufacturers against nonsignors.
But in 1975, in response to the recession of the mid-1970s, Congress
passed the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975,5 repealing the Fair Trade
Amendments.5 In effect, the Act eliminated the antitrust immunity
enjoyed by RPM in states with laws that permitted RPM--otherwise
referred to as "fair trade" laws-and RPM returned to its per se illegal
status in those states .60 The Senate Report concluded that state "fair trade"
laws resulted in an 18-27% increase in the price of goods subject to RPM.6
Repealing the Fair Trade Amendments would thus result in $2.1 billion in
consumer savings.6
52. See Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed 1975)
(providing an exception to the Sherman Act for RPM agreements that would be permitted
under state law).
53. See KINTNER & KRATzKE, supra note 5 1, § 43.19 ("The Miller-Tydings Act
provided that minimum resale prices agreed upon by producers or distributors and resellers
would not violate the Sherman Act if such agreements were permitted under state law as
applied to intrastate transactions.").
54. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951)
(finding an RPM agreement unenforceable against a retailer who refuised to agree to sell at
the fixed price).
55. See id. ("[Slince Congress was writing a law to meet the specifications of state
law, it would seem that if the nonsigner provision as well as the 'contract' provision of state
law were to be written into federal law, the pattern of the legislation would have been
different.").
56. See McGuire Act, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631 (1952) (repealed 1975) (overruling the
Court's decision in Schwegmann Bros.).
57. See KINTNER & KRATzKE, supra note 51, at § 43.19 (describing the various
components of the McGuire Act).
58. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975)
(repealing the Fair Trade Amendments to the Sherman Act).
59. See KINTNER & KRATzKE, supra note 51, at § 43.29 (describing the Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975).
60. See id (noting that the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975 abolished the
"antitrust immunity or immunity from the Federal Trade Commission Act for agreements
which impose vertical restrictions on pricing").
61. See id. (describing the contents of the Senate Report).
62. See id. (discussing the consumer savings that would result from the repeal of the
19
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While Congress articulated its belief that RPM agreements adversely
affected competition by repealing the Fair Trade Amendments, the Court,
beginning with Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 64 started the
process of undercutting the per se rule that led to its decision in Leegin. In
Monsanto, the Court made it more difficult to prove a vertical price
agreement by requiring the plaintiff to show something more than price
effects.6 The antitrust plaintiff must offer "evidence that reasonably tends
to prove that [the parties] had a conscious commitment to a common
scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.",66  In Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. ,6 the Court limited
application of the per se rule to vertical price restraints that required
adherence by the dealer to a specific price or price level .68 In State Oil v.
Khan,6 the Court rejected application of the per se rule to vertical
agreements that set a maximum resale price and held that such restraints
must be evaluated under the rule of reason .70  The Court's gradual
movement away from strict application of the per se rule to all types of
vertical price restraints foreshadowed the Leegin decision.
In 2007, the Court overruled Dr. Miles in Leegin and extended the rule
of reason to all RPM-based claims.7" The defendant, Leegin, manufactured
specialty leather goods under the brand name Brighton and instituted a
policy under which it refused to sell to dealers that discounted its products
Fair Trade Amendments).
63. See id (discussing Congress's motivation for repealing the Fair Trade
Amendments).
64. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Sewv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (requiring
plaintiffs alleging a price-fixing conspiracy to discredit the possibility that a manufacturer
and its purchasers acted independently).
65. See id. at 764 ("[S]omething more than evidence of [price] complaints is
needed.").
66. Id at 768.
67. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988) ("[A]
vertical restraint is not illegal per se unless it includes some agreement on price or price
levels.").
68. Id
69. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (adopting the rule of reason for
maximum vertical price fixing agreements).
70. See id (concluding that maximum vertical price fixing agreements are not per se
illegal under the Sherman Act).
71. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007)
("We now hold that Dr. Miles should be overruled and that vertical price restraints are to be
judged by the rule of reason.").
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below suggested prices.7 In 2002, Leegin discovered that the plaintiff,
PSKS, operating as Kay's Kloset, was discounting Brighton goods and
asked PSKS to stop doing So.71 PSKS refused, and Leegin terminated its
sales to PSKS.7
PSKS sued Leegin in federal court, alleging that Leegin violated § 1 of
the Sherman Act by agreeing with dealers to set a minimum resale price for
Brighton goods.7 Relying on the per se standard articulated in Dr. Miles,
the district court excluded Leegin's proposed expert testimony regarding
the procompetitive justifications for its retail policy, and the jury found for
PSKS.7 The Fifth Circuit rejected Leegin's argument that the rule of
reason should apply to vertical price restraints and affirmed the district
court judgment.7  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.7
Leegin observed that "[tlhe promotion of interbrand competition .. . is
'the primary purpose of the antitrust laws."'7 9 RPM can be procompetitive
because it may stimulate interbrand competition by: (1) reducing
intrabrand price competition and thereby increasing intrabrand nonprice
competition' 8 0 (2) encouraging dealers to offer more product-specific
services to support a brand,8 (3) discouraging discount retailers from "ree-
72. See id at 882-83 (describing the nature of Leegin's business). Because Leegin
dealt primarily with boutique retailers, the stated purpose of the policy was to provide
retailers with a sufficient profit margin, so they would provide consumers with the desired
level of product-specific services. See id. at 883 ("Leegin adopted the policy to give its
retailers sufficient margins to provide customers the service central to its distribution
strategy."t).
73. See id. at 884 ("In December 2002, Leegin discovered [PSKS] had been marking
down Brighton's entire line by 20 percent.").
74. See id ("Its request refused, Leegin stopped selling to the store.").
75. See id ("[PSKS,] alleged, among other claims, that Leegin had violated the
antitrust laws by 'enter[ing] into agreements with retailers to charge only those prices fixed
by Leegin."').
76. See id. at 884 (discussing the trial court's decision to exclude certain testimony
related to the competitive effects of RPM agreements).
77. See id at 885 ("We granted certiorari to determine whether vertical minimum
resale price maintenance agreements should continue to be treated as per se unlawfuil.").
78. See id. at 907-908 (overruling Dr. Miles and remanding the case for consideration
under the rule of reason).
79. Id. at 890 (quoting State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997)).
80. See id. ("The promotion of interbrand competition is important because the
'primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect [this type of] competition."' (citing State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997))).
81. See id. at 890 (discussing the procompetitive effects of offering product-specific
services).
121
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riding" on "full service" dealers, 82 and (4) facilitating market entry for new
brands.8 RPM can be anticompetitive if it: (1) facilitates a cartel at the
manufacturer or dealer level,84 (2) is used to "forestall innovation in
distribution that decreases costs," or (3) "give[s] retailers incentive not to
sell the product of smaller rivals or new entrants."85 PSKS fuirther argued
that RPM leads to higher prices for consumers.8 The Court concluded that
because RPM can be procompetitive, "it cannot be stated with any degree
of confidence that resale price maintenance 'always or almost always
tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output., 87 The rule of reason,
88and not the per se rule, should apply to vertical price restraints.
Leegin identified three factors to guide a rule of reason analysis of
RPM: (1) the percentage of manufacturers in a relevant market using RPM;
(2) whether dealers or manufacturers instigate the restraint; and (3) whether
the party imposing the restraint possesses market power.8 When a large
percentage of manufacturers in a relevant market use RPM, lower courts
should make sure there is no cartel to raise prices at the manufacturer
level.90 If a dealer rather than the manufacturer is the impetus behind the
restraint, there is a "greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer
82. Id at 890-91 (discussing how RPM can eliminate the use of free-riding in the
market).
83. See id. at 891 (explaining how RPM can facilitate entry'into a market).
84. See id. at 892-93 (discussing how RPM can be used to facilitate cartels). The
Court pointed out, however, that such conduct would still be unlawful under a rule of reason
analysis. See id at 893 ("To the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices is
entered upon to facilitate [a] cartel, it, too, would need to be held unlawfuil under the rule of
reason.").
85. Id at 893-94.
86. See id. at 895 ("Respondent also argues the per se rule is justified because a
vertical price restraint can lead to higher prices for the manufacturer's goods."). On remand
from the Supreme Court, PSKS once again argued that Leegin's resale price maintenance
policy artificially increased prices. See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.,
No. 09-40506, 2010 WL 3220384, at *6 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2010) (describing PSKS's
amended complaint). The Fifth Circuit rejected PSKS's argument, applying the market-
powerscreen. See id (finding that absent market power, higher prices can only cause Leegin
to lose business to competitors and cannot cause harm to consumers).
87. Id at 894 (quoting Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723
(1988)).
88. Id ("[RPM]l agreements appear ill suited for per se condemnation.").
89. See id at 897-98 (discussing three factors that could help a lower court apply the
rule of reason to vertical price restraints).
90. See id at 897 (discussing the possible ramifications of having a large percentage
of manufacturers in a relevant market use RPM).
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cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer." 9' Finally, it is less likely
that there will be adverse effects on competition if the party imposing RPM
lacks market power, that is, where interbrand competition is strong. 
92
3. The State Response to Leegin
Many state attorneys general oppose the switch from the per se rule to
the rule of reason articulated in Leegin and believe that RPM remains per se
illegal under their state antitrust laws.9 Virtually all courts, however,
consult federal antitrust precedent when interpreting state antitrust laws.9
It is possible, therefore, that lower courts will interpret state law in
accordance with Leegin and apply the rule of reason to RPM.9
Fearing that Maryland courts might apply the rule of reason post-
Leegin to RPM, the Maryland General Assembly amended the Maryland
Antitrust Act to prohibit per se the use of RPM .9  The General Assembly
made a judgment that RPM universally results in an unreasonable restraint
on competition, and thus, antitrust plaintiffs should not have to sustain the
higher burden of proof required under the rule of reason. 97 The Maryland
RPM prohibition is the first and so far only state legislation expressly
prohibiting RPM.9 While other states might pass legislation in the near
9 1. Jd. at898.
92. See id ("And if a manufacturer lacks market power, there is less likelihood it can
use the practice to keep competitors away from distribution outlets.").
93. See Joel M. Mitnick et al., A Commentary on Current State Enforcement Policy for
RPM.- On Life Support from Leeginaire 's Disease: Can the States Resuscitate Dr. Miles?,
22 ANTITRUST 63, 63 (2008) ("More dramatically, enforcement officials of several states
have asserted that RPM remains per se unlawful under various state antitrust laws despite
Leegin.").
94. See Duncan & Guernsey, supra note 10, at 173-74 (discussing the nature of state
antitrust laws).
95. See, e.g., Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., No. 2:07-CV-187, 2008 WL
391446 1, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008) (applying the rule of reason to RPM uses after
finding no reason why the state supreme court would not follow Leegin).
96. See MD. CODE ANN., Com. LAW § 11-204(b) (LexisNexis 2009) ("[A] contract,
combination, or conspiracy that establishes a minimum price below which a retailer,
wholesaler, or distributor may not sell a commodity or service is an unreasonable restraint of
trade or commerce.").
97. See DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS. OF MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, FISCAL AND POLICY
NOTE: H.B. 657, H. 426, 2009 Sess. (2009) (discussing the policy concerns underlying the
amendment to the Maryland antitrust laws).
98. See Lindsay, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that the Maryland RPM prohibition is the
only state antitrust statute expressly prohibiting RPM).
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future mirroring the Maryland RPM prohibition, for the time being, RPM
may be lawful in every state except Maryland.
III. Resale Price Maintenance Under the Rule of Reason
Leegin is a relatively recent case, and therefore, it is unclear how
courts will apply the rule of reason to vertical price restraints, such as RPM.
However, vertical nonprice restraints, which limit a dealer's ability to resell
a product in a particular geographic area or to a certain type of consumer,99
have been subject to the rule of reason for over thirty years. 00  In
Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,'01 the plaintiff, a dealer of
Sylvania televisions, challenged a so-called location clause in its franchise
agreement that limited the location from which the plaintiff could resell
Sylvania televisions. 10 2  The Sylvania opinion recognized that vertical
nonprice restraints, such as those included in the plaintiffs franchise
agreement, can have both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.1
03
The Court decided, therefore, that the per se rule applicable to vertical
restraints should no longer apply to vertical nonprice restraints, which
would thereafter be subject to rule of reason analysis.'04
The way lower courts have analyzed vertical nonprice restraints post-
Sylvania could foreshadow how RPM will be treated under the rule of
reason post-Leegin. Scholars have described the rule of reason standard
articulated in Sylvania as a "toothless" mode of analysis that has "created a
business climate ... in which virtually any restraint of trade that arguably
99. See BAUER & PAGE, supra note 17, § 12.9 (noting that vertical nonprice restraints
place limitations on a dealer's ability to resell a product and "usually involve a sale
conditioned upon the buyer's agreement not to resell other than in a designated geographic
area or to a certain class of customers").
100. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (declaring that
vertical nonprice restraints should be evaluated under the rule of reason).
101. See id ("In sum, we conclude that the appropriate decision is to return to the rule
of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn.").
102. See id. at 37-38 (discussing the factual context of the case).
103. See id at 54 (discussing how vertical restraints affect interbrand and intrabrand
competition). The Court in Leegin also identified these competitive effects in their analysis
of vertical price restraints. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 890-94 (2007) (discussing the procompetitive and anticompetitive uses of RPM).
104. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59 ("Accordingly, we conclude that the per se rule in
Schwinn must be overruled.... [Wie conclude that the appropriate decision is to return to
the rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn." (citations omitted)).
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can be characterized as 'vertical,' . .. is per se legal."lOS A survey in 1991
revealed that in forty-one of the forty-five post-Sylvania cases involving
vertical nonprice restraints, the plaintiff failed to show a Sherman Act
violation under the rule of reason.' 6  Since 1991, the only successful
challenges of vertical nonprice restraints' 0 7 have been in conjunction with a
finding of monopoly power under § 2 of the Sherman Act.108
Two contributing factors to these statistics are the plaintiff's high
burden of proof under the rule of reason'09 and the judicial development of
a so-called "market-power screen.""0 Using this screen, courts require the
plaintiff to allege that one of the parties to the challenged vertical nonprice
restraint possesses market power as a prerequisite to proceeding with an
antitrust challenge."' Application of the rule of reason to RPM might
therefore result in effectively "per se legal" treatment under the antitrust
laws in cases where the party imposing the restraint lacks market power." 
2
The Fifth Circuit has already adopted a market-power screen for RPM,
requiring plaintiffs to "plausibly allege the defendant's market power" to
sufficiently allege a vertical price restraint." 3 Applying this principle, the
Fifth Circuit rejected PSKS's amended complaint on remand from Leegin
105. Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and its "Rule of Reason ":
The Dealer Termination Cases and the Demise of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 22 CoNN. L.
REv. 129, 134 (1989).
106. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints. De Facto Legality Under the Rule
of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 70-71 (199 1) (reporting the results of a survey conducted
to determine how lower courts have applied the rule of reason standard articulated in
Sylvania).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59-74 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(finding that certain nonprice restraints used by Microsoft Corp. violated § 2 of the Sherman
Act under a rule of reason analysis); United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 188-
90 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding an exclusive dealing policy violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act
after concluding that Dentsply International had monopoly power).
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (prohibiting monopolistic conduct).
109. See id (discussing how the plaintiff's high burden of proof has contributed to the
creation of a "per se legal" standard).
1 10. See Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfleld Imps., Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 666 (7th Cir. 1987)
("Only if [the plaintiff] can allege facts that give rise to an inference that [defendant] had
sufficient market power..,. must we proceed to the first step of the Rule of Reason analysis,
which is to balance the effects the vertical restraint has no intrabrand and interbrand
competition.").
I111. See id (describing how the "market-power screen" is applied).
112. See Ginsburg, supra note 106, at 67 ("I conclude that non-monopolists have been
effectively freed from antitrust regulation of vertical nonprice restraints.").
113. PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 09-40506, 2010 WL
3220384, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2010).
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as failing to define a relevant product market in which Leegin had market
power.'"4  Given the permissive treatment by federal courts of vertical
nonprice restraints post-Sylvania," 5 and the Fifth Circuit's use of a market-
power scen' 1 federal courts applying the rule of reason articulated in
Leegin will likely find RPM lawful in all or almost all situations in which
the manufacturer lacks market power. The remainder of this Note assumes
that the Maryland RPM prohibition would prohibit conduct that § 1 of the
Sherman Act would not.
IV Federal Preemption
The Maryland RPM prohibition, with its per se proscription of RPM
agreements, is in diametric conflict with Leegin's interpretation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act. Does Leegin's interpretation of the Sherman Act,
therefore, preempt the Maryland RPM prohibition?
The concept of federal preemption originates in the Supremacy Clause,
which dictates that federal law should supplant any conflicting state law in
a given fil.'1 Congress can preempt state law in exercising its Article I
enumerated powers in three ways: (1) an express statement to that effect;
(2) federal occupation of a given field; or (3) conflict between state and
federal law such that the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."" 8  The Maryland RPM prohibition implicates federal
preemption because it declares RPM per se illegal, even though Lee gin
declares such agreements subject to rule of reason analysis. The practical
effect of the Maryland RPM prohibition, therefore, is to prohibit conduct
that likely will be permissible under the federal antitrust laws." 9
114. See id. ("Indeed, it is impossible to imagine that Leegin could have power over
[the market for women's accessories].").
115. See Ginsburg, supra note 106, at 70-71 (stating that by 1991, over 90% of the
cases decided since Sylvania found the use of vertical nonprice restraints permissive under
the Sherman Act).
116. See PSKS, 2010 WL 3220384, at *5 (applying a market-power screen to vertical
price restraint claims).
117. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States .. . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.").
118. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989) (articulating the
three bases for finding preemption).
119. See supra Part III (discussing the legacy of Sylvania and its implications for
vertical price restraints following Leegin).
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The first two bases for preemption-express language declaring
preemption and federal occupation of a given field--do not apply here.
First, nothing in the Leegin opinion precludes concurrent state regulation of
RPM agreements. Second, it is well-settled that antitrust is "an area
traditionally regulated by the States," not the federal government., 20  As
articulated by Senator Sherman, the intent of the Sherman Act was "to
supplement the enforcement of the established rules of the common and
statute law by the courts of the several states in dealing with combinations
that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the citizens of these states."'1
2 1
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act in Leegin,
therefore, will preempt the Maryland RPM prohibition only if an actual
conflict exists, such that the Maryland RPM prohibition "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."122  Some scholars would argue that the Court's
decision in California v. ARC America Corp.' 23 answers the preemption
question in the negative, even where a direct conflict exists between state
and federal antitrust law.'
24
In ARC America, several states that were indirect purchasers of
concrete brought suit to recover for an alleged conspiracy to fix the price of
concrete block.'125 Twelve years prior, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,126 the
120. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101. Prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act,
twenty-one states had already developed antitrust laws to regulate monopolies and unfair
business practices. See id. at 101 n.4 ("At the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act, 21
States had already adopted their own antitrust laws.").
121. 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890) (emphasis added). Senator Sherman continued, "It is
to arm the federal courts within the limits of their constitutional power that they may co-
operate with the State courts in checking, curbing and controlling the most dangerous
combinations that now threaten the business, property, and trade of the people of the United
States." Id.
122. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101.
123. See id at 105-06 (finding no support for federal preemption of state laws allowing
indirect purchasers to bring suit against manufacturers for overcharges although prohibited
from doing so under federal law).
124. See HERBERT HOVENKAmp, ANTITRUST LAW 1 2403a, at 318 (2d ed. 2006) ("[Tlhe
Supreme Court has made clear that state antitrust law is not preempted even when the state
statute or state judicial or agency interpretations are inconsistent with prevailing federal
law.",).
125. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97-98 (1989) (discussing the
factual premise of the case).
126. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (prohibiting indirect
purchasers of goods from recovering antitrust damages under the Clayton Act). In Illinois
Brick, the State of Illinois alleged that concrete block manufacturers conspired to fix prices.
Id. at 726-27. The State of Illinois commissioned government projects that incorporated
127
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Court had held that only direct purchasers qualify as injured parties that can
recover under the federal antitrust laws.'12 7  In response to Illinois Brick,
states passed so-called "Illinois Brick repealers" to amend their state
antitrust laws to permit indirect purchasers to recover damages resulting
from violations of the state antitrust laws.128  The plaintiffs in ARC
America, therefore, sought damages relief under their state antitrust laws
using the "Illinois Brick repealer" provision.1
29
The issue before the Court was whether Illinois Brick's prohibition on
recovery of damages by indirect purchasers preempted state statutes that
permitted recovery.'" 0 Although there was a conflict between the state laws
with "Illinois Brick repealers" and the interpretation of the federal antitrust
laws in Illinois Brick, the state laws did not "pose an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of Congress.""3' Both the
state antitrust laws with "Illinois Brick repealers" and the federal antitrust
laws had the same goal of "deterring anti-competitive conduct and ensuring
the compensation of victims of that conduct." 312 In addition, because the
Illinois Brick opinion included no discussion of state law or preemption, it
did not "suggest[] that it would be contrary to congressional purposes for
States to allow indirect purchasers to recover under their own antitrust
laws."133 The result in Illinois Brick, therefore, did not preempt the "Illinois
Brick repealers. 0,34*
concrete blocks. Id at 735. The Court held that only a direct purchaser of concrete block
(in this case, the government contractor who purchased the concrete block for the
government project) was a party "'injured in his business or property"' entitled to sue under
the Clayton Act, not another party "in the chain of manufacture or distribution." Id at 729,
735-37. The Court reasoned that allowing both indirect and direct purchasers to recover
would create a risk of multiple liabilities for defendants. Id at 730-31. The Court also
noted the difficulties in tracing an overcharge along the chain of distribution. Id at 731-32.
127. See id at 745-46 (limiting recovery under § 4 of the Clayton Act to direct
purchasers).
128. See ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 98 ("In their complaints, however, appellants also
alleged violations of their respective state antitrust laws under which, as a matter of state
law, indirect purchasers arguably are allowed to recover for all overcharges passed on to
them by direct purchasers.").
129. See id at 97-98 (discussing the nature of the plaintiff's claims).
130. See id at 100 ("The issue before us is whether this rule limiting recoveries under
the Sherman Act also prevents indirect purchasers from recovering damages flowing from
violations of state law, despite express state statutory provisions giving such purchasers a
damages cause of action.").
13 1. Id at 102.
132. Id
133. Id at 102-03.
134. See id at 105-06 ("The congressional purposes on which Illinois Brick was based
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In the context of the Maryland RPM prohibition, the Court's analysis
in ARC America, while instructive, is not conclusive. The ARC America
opinion proceeded under the assumption that liability would be found under
both the federal and state antitrust laws and addressed only the question of
who could recover damages from the antitrust defendant.' 35  The Leegin
opinion, juxtaposed with the Maryland RPM prohibition, however, presents
a situation in which a party would be found to violate the state antitrust law
but likely would not under federal law.'
316
Although some scholars consider federal preemption in antitrust to be
foreclosed from discussion by ARC America,' 37 the Supreme Court's
analysis in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland' is more appropriate, as
that case involved a Maryland law that prohibited certain types of discounts
that otherwise might have been permitted under the Robinson-Patman
Act,139 the federal price discrimination law. In Exxon, several oil
companies challenged the constitutionality of a Maryland statute that
prohibited petroleum producers or refiners from operating retail service
stations in Maryland and required them to extend any temporary price
reductions granted to dealers in response to local competitive conditions
uniformly to all stations they supplied in the state.140 The Court identified
provide no support for a finding that state indirect purchaser statutes are pre-empted by
federal law.").
135. See ROBERT M. LANGER, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE WORKSHOP 10 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/resale
pricemaintenance/00001 .pdf ("ARC America, however, dealt only with the question whether,
assuming liability was pre-determined, a certain group of plaintiffs could recover under state
law when that same group could not recover under federal law.").
136. See id ("That issue is fundamentally distinct from the question whether a party can
be liable for a price fixing conspiracy under state law yet not liable for the same conduct
under federal law, and this distinction has not been lost on other commentators."); Michael
A. Lindsay, Resale Price Maintenance and the World After Leegin, 22 ANTITRUST 32, 33
(2007) ("ARC America dealt with a procedural or remedial rule, rather than a substantive
rule of conduct. Leegin, however, dealt with a substantive rule of conduct: whether
minimum RPM agreements are automatically illegal.").
137. See HOVENKAmp, supra note 124, at 318 (arguing that the Court's decision in ARC
America establishes that state antitrust laws are never preempted by federal antitrust laws).
138. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1978) (finding that a
Maryland law requiring price reductions to be extended uniformly was not preempted by
§ 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (2006) (establishing the "meeting competition" defense to
rebut a prima facie case of price discrimination).
140. See Exxon, 43 7 U.S. at 119-20 ("A Maryland statute provides that a producer or
refiner of petroleum products (1) may not operate any retail service station within the State,
and (2) must extend all 'voluntary allowances' uniformly to all service stations it supplies."
(citations omitted)). The express purpose of the statute was to correct preferential treatment
129
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the issue as whether the statewide price reduction requirement violated the
Commerce Clause or Due Process Clause or was preempted by
"1congressional expression of policy favoring vigorous competition found in
§ 2(b) of the [Robinson-Patman Act] .",14 ' The Court of Appeals of
Maryland upheld the Maryland statute, and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed.14 2
The Court rejected the two preemption arguments proffered by the oil
companies: "[T]he requirement that voluntary allowances be extended to
all retail service stations is either in direct conflict with § 2(b) of.. . the
Robinson-Patman Act, or, more generally, in conflict with the basic federal
policy in favor of competition."143  First, the oil companies attempted to
prove that compliance with the Maryland statute might necessitate a
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.'" The oil companies described
various hypothetical situations in which requiring a statewide price
reduction might result in "discrimination between consumers who would
otherwise receive the same price."' 4 5 The Court rejected the oil companies'
hypothetical situations as an attempt to "'seek[] out conflicts between state
and federal regulation where none clearly exists."" 46  The Court
characterized the oil companies' alleged "conflict" as "the possibility that
the Maryland statute may require uniformity in some situations in which the
Robinson-Patman Act would permit localized discrimination" and found it
insufficient to support a federal preemption claim.1
47
With respect to the Maryland RPM prohibition and the Court's
interpretation of the Sherman Act in Leegin, a very likely hypothetical
situation does exist in which Maryland would prohibit conduct that might
otherwise be permissible under the Sherman Act. For example, a
manufacturer with a low market share might impose RPM agreements on
its dealers to compete more effectively against other larger competitors in
response to free-riding in the market or to increase the level of product-
given to company-owned gasoline stations during the petroleum shortage of 1973. See id at
121 (discussing the policy behind the Maryland statute at issue).
14 1. Id at 120.
142. See id. at 120-21 ("The Court of Appeals of Maryland answered these questions in
favor of the validity of the statute .. .. We affirm." (citations omitted)).
143. Id at 129.
144. See id at 130 ("Appellants' first argument is that compliance with the Maryland
statute may cause them to violate the Rohinson-Patman Act.").
145. Id
146. Id (quoting Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35,45 (1966)).
147. Id at 13 1.
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specific services offered to consumers. Under the Maryland RPM
prohibition, that agreement, regardless of motivation or effect, would be
irrebuttably presumed to be illegal. 14 8 Under federal law, however, the
RPM provision would be subject to a rule of reason analysis. 149 Given the
procompetitive effects of RPM on interbrand competition, a federal court
likely would conclude that the RPM use is lawful because the
procompetitive effects outweigh any elimination of intrabrand
competition. 50 As the Court explained in Exxon, however, an alleged
conflict in which state law would prohibit conduct that might be
permissible under federal law is insufficient to find federal preemption.''
The oil companies also attempted to prove that the "meeting
competition" defense provided in § 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act
"establishes a federal right to engage in discriminatory pricing in certain
situations.0 52  The "meeting competition" defense permits the seller to
rebut a prima facie case of price discrimination by "showing that his lower
price ... was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor."513  The Court described the language in § 2(b), however, as
merely granting a limited defense and dismissed the oil companies'
contention, observing that it was "illogical to infer that by excluding certain
competitive behavior from the general ban against discriminatory pricing,
Congress intended to pre-empt the States' power to prohibit any conduct
within that exclusion."' 5 4  Moreover, the Court found no conflict in the
policy underlying both the Robinson-Patman Act and the Maryland statute:
Both statutes "reflect a policy choice favoring the interest in equal treatment
148. See MD. CODE ANN., Com. LAW § 11-204(b) (LexisNexis 2009) ("[A] contract,
combination, or conspiracy that establishes a minimum price below which a retailer,
wholesaler, or distributor may not sell a commodity or service is an unreasonable restraint of
trade or commerce.").
149. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007)
(finding that the rule of reason is the appropriate standard of review for vertical price
restraints).
150. See id at 886 ("In its design and function the rule [of reason] distinguishes
between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints
stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best interest.").
151. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 131 (1978) ("Instead, the
alleged 'conflict' here is in the possibility that the Maryland statute may require uniformity
in some situations in which the Robinson-Patman Act would permnit localized
discrimination." (citations omitted)).
152. Id.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (2006).
154. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 132.
131
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of all customers over the interest in allowing sellers freedom to make
selective competitive decisions."'
Similarly, it is difficult to argue that the Supreme Court intended to
establish a federal right to engage in RPM by interpreting the Sherman Act
in Leegin to permit a rule of reason analysis for RPM.156 Leegin recognized
that RPM can have anticompetitive effects and cautioned federal courts to
look specifically for anticompetitive uses of RPM.157 Although the legacy
of Sylvania suggests that federal courts ultimately may treat RPM
effectively as "per se legal" under the rule of reason if the manufacturer
lacks market power, a federal court is unlikely to find a federal right to
engage in RPM, given the anticompetitive effects identified in Leegin. 1
58
Together, the Maryland RPM prohibition, the Sherman Act, and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act in Leegin reflect a
policy objective to eliminate anticompetitive practices from the market.'5 9
The only difference is that the State of Maryland has made a legislative
judgment that there are few, if any, instances where procompetitive effects
of RPM will outweigh its anticompetitive effects.160  Because the
underlying policy goals are the same, however, preemption would be
inappropriate here, as it was in Exxon.'1
6'
155. Id. at 132-33.
156. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007)
(applying the rule of reason to vertical price restraints).
157. See id. at 897 ("[Clourts would have to be diligent in eliminating [RPM's] anti-
competitive uses from the market.").
158. See id. at 892-94 (discussing potential anti-competitive uses of RPM).
159. See DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERvS. OF MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, FISCAL AND POLICY
NOTE: H.B. 657, H. 426, 2009 Sess. (2009) ("The Maryland Antitrust Act is designed to
promote fair and honest competition, free of conspiracies, combinations, or agreements
which unreasonably restrain trade or commerce."); 21 Cong. Rec. 2558 (1890) (stating that
one of the purposes of the Shernan Act was to eliminate conduct that "hinder[ed],
interrupt[ed], and impair[ed]" fairness in the marketplace); Leegin, 551 U.S. at 897 ("Resale
price maintenance, it is true, does have economic dangers. If the rule of reason were to
apply to vertical price restraints, courts would have to be diligent in eliminating their
anticompetitive uses from the market.").
160. See DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS. OF MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, FISCAL AND POLICY
NOTE: H.B. 657, H. 426, 2009 Sess. (2009) ("The bill classifies a contract, combination, or
conspiracy that establishes a minimum price below which a retailer, wholesaler, or
distributor may not sell a commodity or service as an unreasonable restraint of trade or
commerce under the Maryland Antitrust Act.").
161. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978) (finding no
conflict between the policy concerns behind the Robinson-Patman Act and the Maryland
statute at issue).
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In addition, the Supreme Court has been "generally reluctant to infer
pre-emption."16 2  Because preemption is based on "principles of
federalism," the presumption is "in favor of state law and against the
exercise of federal supremacy."16 3  For example, in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp. ,' 6 the Supreme Court started its analysis "with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."165  Even where the state and federal laws are
"1seemingly on a direct collision course," the Court has, in the past,
expressed an aversion to finding "automatic preemption."166 Thus, even in
the unlikely event that a manufacturer who engages in RPM could articulate
an express conflict between the Maryland RPM prohibition and federal law
such that the Maryland RPM prohibition stands as an obstacle to
Congress's goals in enacting the Sherman Act, a court would likely be
hesitant to find federal preemption of the Maryland RPM prohibition.
V The Commerce Clause
The Maryland RPM prohibition, as applied to commerce on the
Internet, has the potential to regulate conduct occurring wholly outside the
state. Does the Maryland RPM prohibition, therefore, violate the dormant
Commerce Clause?
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority "[tlo regulate
Commerce. ... among the several States."167 The Framers granted Congress
absolute power over interstate commerce to avoid the "economic
Balkanization" that "plagued relations among the Colonies and later among
the States under the Articles of Confederation."16 8 The Commerce Clause
embodies the "principle that our economic unit is the Nation" and as a
162. Id
163. Milton Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1380 (1978).
164. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) (finding that an
Illinois law regulating grain warehouses was beyond the reach of the Illinois Commission
under the Supremacy Clause because Congress had "declared its policy in the Warehouse
Act").
165. Id. at 230.
166. Handler, supra note 163, at 1380 (citing Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 623, 653 (1975)).
167. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cI. 3 ("[T]he Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
regulate Commerce . .. among the several States ... 1.
168. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
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result, "the states are not separable economic units." 169 The Supreme Court
has accordingly inferred from the Commerce Clause a "dormant" or
"negative" Commerce Clause that "limits the power of the States to
discriminate against interstate commerce."1
7 0
The first step to analyzing a statute under the dormant Commerce
Clause is to determine whether the state statute "regulates even-handedly
with only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates
against interstate commerce.""7 ' A statute impermissibly discriminates if it
requires "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."172  If the state
regulation is discriminatory, it is "virtually per se invalid."1
73
The Maryland RPM prohibition regulates evenhandedly because it
does not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state entities using RPM .'
74
No matter their locale, manufacturers imposing RPM would be subject to
liability under the statute. In the context of the Internet, however, the
Maryland RPM prohibition results in impermissible economic
protectionism or direct regulation of commerce occurring completely
outside the state.
A. In Defense of the Maryland RPM Prohi bition
In response to a Commerce Clause challenge to the Maryland RPM
prohibition, the Maryland Attorney General or private plaintiff might first
defend the Maryland RPM prohibition by pointing out that an out-of-state
entity can simply choose not to do business in the State of Maryland if it
does not wish to comply. In National Electrical Manufacturers Association
v. Sorrell, 17 5 the Second Circuit considered a Commerce Clause challenge
169. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949).
170. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (discussing the Court's
jurisprudence with respect to the Dormant Commerce Clause).
171. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
172. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1993).
173. Id
174. See MD. CODE ANN., Com. LAW § 11-204(b) (LexisNexis 2009) ("[A] contract,
combination, or conspiracy that establishes a minimum price below which a retailer,
wholesaler, or distributor may not sell a commodity or service is an unreasonable restraint of
trade or commerce.").
175. See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2001)
(concluding that a Vermont statute requiring labels to be affixed to certain products
containing mercury did not violate the Commerce Clause or the First Amendment).
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to a Vermont law that required manufacturers of mercury-containing
products to place a label on their products that displayed the product's
mercury content and proper disposal procedures.176 Manufacturers of lamps
containing mercury argued that compliance with the statute might be
prohibitively expensive because "the demand for [the products] in Vermont
may be such that their increased price would so severely reduce
consumption that the lamps could no longer be sold profitably in
Vermont.0 77 Because the manufacturer's decision to abandon the Vermont
market would be based on economic necessity and not some factor under
the state's control, the court held that the Vermont statute did not violate the
Commerce Clause merely because some manufacturers might abandon the
market if the cost of compliance became too high.'1
7 8
The Sorrell opinion teaches, therefore, that if a manufacturer would
choose to withdraw from the Maryland market out of economic necessity,
there should be no Commerce Clause implications for the Maryland RPM
prohibition.179 As applied to manufacturers and internet dealers, however,
there are three flaws with the argument that a manufacturer could simply
withdraw from the Maryland market if it does not wish to comply with the
Maryland RPM prohibition. First, in the internet context, selling into
Maryland in compliance with the Maryland RPM prohibition is not
practically possible while, at the same time, using RPM for sales into states
where it would otherwise be permissible. Second, to withdraw effectively
from the Maryland market while continuing to sell into other states, a
manufacturer would have to impose a potentially per se illegal nonprice
restraint on its internet dealers to prohibit them from selling to Maryland
consumers. Finally, even if the manufacturer could withdraw from the
Maryland market without risking liability, the practical effect of the statute
would be to promote the interests of in-state "traditional" brick-and-mortar
dealers over the interests of internet dealers.
176. See id at 107 (describing the Vermont statute).
177. Id.atlll.
178. See id ("Because none of these variables is controlled by the state in this case, we
cannot say that the choice to stay or leave has been made for manufacturers by the state
legislature, as the Commerce Clause would prohibit.").
179. See id. (concluding that because the manufacturer abandoned the market out of
economic necessity, the Vermont statute did not force the manufacturer to withdraw).
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1. Impossibility of Compliance
The Second Circuit's conclusion in Sorrell with respect to a
manufacturer's decision to withdraw from a state's market applies only to a
situation in which a manufacturer leaves the market out of economic
necessity, not because compliance is impossible.180  The State or private
plaintiff's argument that the manufacturer can simply abandon the
Maryland market if it does not wish to comply with the Maryland RPM
prohibition, therefore, assumes that compliance with the statute is possible
over the Internet.
Because the Internet lacks geographic boundaries'8 ' and is dominated
by price competition, 18 2 compliance with the Maryland RPM prohibition is
virtually impossible if the manufacturer wishes to sell into Maryland
without using RPM, but continue to use RPM in states where it would be
permissible. The RPM agreement with internet dealers would have to
include an express provision that would allow dealers to set their own
prices in Maryland. Internet dealers wishing to use a lower price for
Maryland sales would either have to display two prices,' 183 one applicable in
states where RPM is permissible and another applicable in Maryland, or it
would have to incorporate technology that would display the price
applicable to the individual internet user. The first option is unworkable
given the nature of the Internet, and the second option might still expose the
manufacturer to the risk of liability.
If an internet dealer posts two prices on its website to comply with the
manufacturer's RPM agreement, non-Maryland consumers likely will
180. See id at I111 ("Because none of these variables is controlled by the state in this
case, we cannot say that the choice to stay or leave has been made for manufacturers by the
state legislature, as the Commerce Clause would prohibit.").
181. See Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 103 (2d. Cir. 2003)
(characterizing the Internet as "boundary-less").
182. See Brad Stone, The Fight over Who Sets Prices at the Online Mall, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2010, at BI (describing competition among internet dealers as a "race to the
bottom").
183. An internet dealer might avoid posting two prices by independently deciding that
the resale price set in the RPM agreement will also be the price applicable in Maryland.
Price competition on the Internet, however, has "unlocked a race to the bottom-with
everyone from large corporations to garage-based sellers ravenously discounting products,
and even selling them at a loss, in an effort to capture market share." Stone, supra note 182,
at B 1. If an internet dealer uses the RPM price in Maryland, other dealers will deliberately
post a lower price, even at a loss, to destroy the internet dealer using the RPM price. It is,
therefore, unlikely that an internet dealer would independently use the RPM price in
Maryland.
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"resist being charged higher prices than [Maryland] consumers for identical
products."TM Consumers will go on an internet dealer's website and try to
capture the lower price applicable to Maryland consumers. If they cannot,
significant consumer ill-will is likely to result. If the internet dealer
responds to the consumer resistance and extends the non-RPM price to a
non-Maryland consumer, the dealer risks termination by the manufacturer
and could ultimately render the manufacturer's use of RPM to be a nullity.
Once one internet dealer "breaks" the RPM price, others are likely to
follow. The manufacturer's RPM program will break down as a result.
Instead of posting two prices, internet dealers could attempt to
incorporate technology into their website that would allow the internet
dealer to distinguish between consumers based on geographic location.8
The internet dealer could track the internet protocol (IP) address of a user's
computer to determine the user's geographic location.186 The manufacturer
exposes itself to potential liability under the Maryland RPM prohibition,
however, if a Maryland internet user employs internet anonymizers or
accesses the Internet remotely and is sold the product at the RPM price.1
8 7
Other technologies using "static Internet addresses, credit card numbers,
and direct user authentication" have similar problems., 88  Because
consumers often resist attempts to collect identifying information over the
Internet without their express consent, 19consumers take active steps to
anonymize their internet transactions. While these methods might allow an
internet dealer's website to display different prices based on the user's
184. Yannis Bakos, The Emerging Landscape for Retail E-Commerce, i15 J. EcoN.
PERSP. 69, 73 (2001).
185. See Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, Conditioning Prices on Purchase
History, MARKETING Sci., Vol. 24, No. 3, at 367, 367 (2005) (discussing how sellers can use
technology to condition prices on characteristics of the individual consumer). This assumes
that the RPM policy would allow the internet dealer to use this type of technology. Most
manufacturers would require the RPM price to be posted for all consumers accessing the
internet dealer's website.
186. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Inter-net and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1 10 YALE L.J. 785, 810 (2001) ( "Much more promising are developing technologies
that allow webpage content providers instantly to determine the content receiver's
geographical identity on the basis of the Internet protocol (IW) address of the user's
computer.").
187. See id at 810-11 ("[Tlhese geographical identification technologies can presently
be defeated by Internet anonymizers, remote sessions via Telnet, and remote dial-up
connections.").
188. Acquisti & Varian, supra note 185, at 367.
189. See id. at 367-68 ("In addition, consumers can voice their displeasure for pricing
policies perceived as discriminatory or intrusive, as happened after the famous Amazon.com
price experiment." (citations omnitted)).
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geographic location, they have serious flaws that will potentially expose the
manufacturer to liability.
At least one court has found, however, that these user-identification
technologies could be workable. In SPGCC, LLC v. Blumenthal,'"0 the
Second Circuit upheld a Connecticut consumer protection statute that
prohibited the sale of gift cards subject to dormancy fees or to an expiration
date 9 ' because SPGCC could use credit card billing addresses to
distinguish between consumers who lived in Connecticut and those who
lived elsewhere.192  The Second Circuit acknowledged this was a "near-
perfect" method but did not discuss SPGCC's risk of liability if a
Connecticut consumer used an anonymous payment technology or an out-
of-state billing address.193  If the potential for liability is not a factor in
considering whether a manufacturer can comply with the Maryland RPM
prohibition, a court could use the Second Circuit's reasoning to reject the
contention that compliance is impossible if the manufacturer wants to use
RPM in other states. Given the precarious nature of user-identification
technology, however, the potential for liability probably makes these
technologies unworkable for use in complying with a state internet
regulation.
In the internet context, compliance with the Maryland RPM
prohibition is practically impossible if the manufacturer wants to use RPM
in other states and sell its products over the Internet to Maryland
consumers. A manufacturer must either abandon its RPM programs in
states where they would otherwise be legal or stop selling its product over
the Internet to Maryland consumers. The first option demonstrates the
Maryland RPM prohibition's impermissible extraterritorial reach, and the
second option might expose the manufacturer to further liability under the
Maryland antitrust laws for the use of vertical nonprice restraints in
furtherance of a vertical price restraint.
190. See SPGOC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 196 (2d. Cir. 2007) (upholding a
Connecticut consumer protection law related to the sale of gift cards against a Commerce
Clause challenge).
191. See id. at 187 (describing the Connecticut Gift Card Law).
192. See id. at 195 ("SPGGC has readily available a near-perfect means of
distinguishing between online consumers of the Simon Giftcard who reside in Connecticut
and those who reside elsewhere-their credit card billing addresses.").
193. See id. (describing how SPGGC could use credit card billing addresses to
distinguish between internet consumers).
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2. The Use of a Vertical Nonprice Restraint in Furtherance of a Price
Restraint
If a manufacturer chooses to withdraw from the Maryland market
rather than comply with the Maryland RPM prohibition, the manufacturer
would need to impose a vertical nonprice restraint on its internet dealers.
Vertical nonprice restraints place limitations on a dealer's ability to resell a
product and "usually involve a sale conditioned upon the buyer's agreement
not to resell other than in a designated geographic area or to a certain class
of customers." 194  The manufacturer would prohibit the internet dealers
from selling the manufacturer's product to persons located in Maryland,
and the internet dealers would have to post on their websites that they do
not sell to Maryland residents.
Vertical nonprice restraints are subject to the rule of reason,' 95 but
when used in furtherance of a vertical price restraint, a Maryland court
might find them per se illegal in this context using the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning in Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.'19 6  Spray-Rite
Service Corporation (Spray-Rite) alleged that Monsanto Company
(Monsanto) conspired with its distributors to fix the resale price of
Monsanto's product in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.'197 Spray-Rite
claimed that "Monsanto terminated [its] distributorship, adopted
compensation programs and shipping policies, and encouraged distributors
to boycott Spray-Rite in furtherance of [a price-fixing] conspiracy."1
9 8
With respect to Monsanto's compensation programs and shipping policies,
the district court instructed the jury that the use of customer or territorial
restraints as part of a price-fixing plan or boycott is per se unlawful.199 On
appeal, Monsanto argued that its compensation programs and shipping
policies were vertical nonprice restraints subject to the rule of reason.20
194. BAUER & PAGE, supra note 17, at § 12.9.
195. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (declaring that
vertical nonprice restraints should be evaluated under the rule of reason).
196. See Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1251 (7th Cir. 1982)
(affirming the jury verdict that Monsanto conspired with its distributors to fix the resale
prices of Monsanto's products).
197. See id. at 1232 (discussing the nature of Spray-Rite's suit against Monsanto).
198. Id at 1233.
199. See id. at 1237 ("The court instructed the jury that it is per se unlawful for a
manufacturer to utilize customer or territorial restrictions as part of a comprehensive price-
fixing plan or boycott.').
200. See id. ("Monsanto claims that the court should have instructed the jury to
determine the lawfulness of its compensation programs and shipping policies pursuant to the
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The Seventh Circuit rejected Monsanto's argument and approved the jury
instruction that stated "Monsanto's otherwise lawful compensation
programs and shipping policies were per se unlawful if undertaken as part
of an illegal scheme to fix prices."
0 '1
Because interpretation of the Maryland antitrust laws is guided by
federal precedent,202 Maryland could use the Seventh Circuit's reasoning to
hold a manufacturer liable for prohibiting its internet dealers from selling in
Maryland in connection with its use of RPM in other states. The
manufacturer is then presented with a "Catch-22" if it wishes to use RPM in
states where it would otherwise be permissible. If the manufacturer
abandons the Maryland market, as the state or private plaintiff would
suggest it could, it could be held liable under the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning if its decision to prohibit internet dealers from selling to
Maryland consumers is in connection with its decision to use RPM in other
states. A manufacturer's decision to stop selling its product over the
Internet to Maryland consumers will likely be in furtherance of its RPM
programs in states where they are permissible because the only way that a
manufacturer can use RPM outside of Maryland is by withdrawing from the
Maryland market. To avoid liability completely, therefore, the
manufacturer will have to abandon its RPM use in all states because of the
Maryland statute's extraterritorial reach.
3. The Benefit to In-State Dealers
Although the Vermont law was upheld in Sorrell, the Second Circuit
suggested that if a state regulation "creat[ed] market incentives that
encourage out-of-state manufacturers to abandon a state market while
encouraging in-state manufacturers to pick-up the slack," the regulation
might violate the Commerce Clause .203 Assuming that a manufacturer can
withdraw from the Maryland market by prohibiting its internet dealers from
selling to Maryland consumers, the manufacturer will decide to stop selling
its product in Maryland because RPM can be very beneficial to the
rule of reason rather than the per se rule.").
201. Id. at 1237 (emphasis added).
202. See Quality Disc. Tires, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 382 A.2d 867, 869
(Md. 1978) (noting that in adopting the Maryland Antitrust Act, the Maryland General
Assembly intended that lower courts be guided by federal interpretation of federal antitrust
laws dealing with the same conduct); Natural Design, Inc. v. The Rouse Co., 485 A.2d 663,
666 (Md. 1984) (same).
203. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 111 (2d. Cir. 2001).
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manufacturer. As a result, in-state brick and mortar establishments will
"pick-up the slack" as sales that would have otherwise occurred over the
Internet would then be made by in-state brick and mortar dealers.2 04 In-
state brick and mortar dealers will, therefore, benefit at the expense of
internet dealers from the manufacturer's decision to stop selling its product
to Maryland consumers over the Internet.
While the Maryland statute regulates evenhandedly, the market
incentives it creates result in a concerted benefit to in-state brick and mortar
establishments. As previously discussed, compliance with the Maryland
statute is not possible over the Internet if the manufacturer wishes to use
RPM in states where it would be permissible .20 5  The statute, therefore,
creates "market incentives" that will lead a manufacturer to decide to
abandon the Maryland market if it wants to use RPM in states where it
would be permissible, and in-state brick and mortar establishments will
capture the business lost by internet dealers. The Sorrell opinion suggests
that if the statute has this effect, it might violate the Commerce Clause
regardless of any extraterritorial effects it might have.20
B. The Extraterritoriality Principle
The extraterritoriality aspect of the dormant Commerce Clause
"establishes a per se bar against state laws regulating commerce occurring
'wholly outside of the State's borders."' 20 7  In the 1980s, the Court
developed three principles to guide an extraterritorial analysis in response
to Commerce Clause challenges to state price-affirmation and anti-takeover
statutes.20 Over the past decade, these principles have been applied in the
204. See id (suggesting that state regulations could create market incentives
encouraging "in-state manufacturers to pick-up the slack").
205. See supra Part V.A. 1 (discussing the impossibility of compliance).
206. See Nat 7I Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n, 272 F.3d at I111 ("[A] regulation might violate the
Commerce Clause by creating market incentives that encourage out-of-state manufacturers
to abandon a state market while encouraging in-state manufacturers to pick-up the
slack . ... )
207. Michael J. Ruttinger, Note, Is there a Dormant Extraterritoriality Principle?:
Commerce Clause Limits on State Antitrust Laws, 106 MICH. L. REv. 545, 549 (2007)
(quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
208. See id at 556 ("The Extraterritoriality Principle emerged as a prohibition on
statutes regulating out-of-state transactions, with the goal of mitigating the regulatory chaos
created by state 'affirmation laws' and 'anti-takeover laws,' which began to proliferate in the
1980s." (citations omitted)).
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internet context to statutes seeking to regulate content posted on the
Internet.
1. The Extraterritorial Reach
First, the "Commerce Clause ... precludes the application of a state
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders,
whether or not the commerce has effects within the State." 209 In Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authoriy and Healy v.
Beer Institute,1 the Court applied this principle to strike down two state
statutes that impermissibly regulated the price of beer and liquor outside of
the enacting state.
In Brown-Forman, the Court considered a challenge to a New York
statute that required every liquor distiller or producer to affirm that the price
of liquor charged to New York wholesalers was no higher than the lowest
price charged to wholesalers anywhere else in the United States .21 '2 While
the statute was evenhanded and asserted a legitimate state interest-
providing residents with the lowest possible prices-it directly regulated
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. 1 The effect of the New
York statute was to preclude liquor distillers and producers from lowering
their prices elsewhere once they posted their New York prices.2t Thus,
while the New York law applied only to sales of liquor in New York, it
impermissibly regulated prices to be paid for liquor in other states.21
In Healy, the Court considered a challenge to a Connecticut statute
that "require[d] out-of-state shippers of beer to affirm that their posted
209. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982).
210. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 584
(1986) (finding that a New York price-affirmation statute violated the Commerce Clause by
directly regulating commerce outside the State's borders).
211. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-40 (1989) (finding that a Connecticut
price-affirmation statute violated the Cormmerce Clause by regulating commerce outside the
State's borders).
212. See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 575-76 (describing the New York price-
affirmation statute).
213. See id. at 584 (striking down the New York price affirmation statute as a violation
of the Commerce Clause).
214. See id. at 582 (noting that once a distiller posted its prices in New York, it could
not change its prices elsewhere during the relevant month).
215. See id at 583 ("That the ABC Law is addressed only to sales of liquor in New
York is irrelevant if the 'practical effect' of the law is to control liquor prices in other
States." (citations omitted)).
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prices for products sold to Connecticut wholesalers are, as of the moment of
posting, no higher than the prices at which those products are sold in the




Connecticut attempted to distinguish its price affirmation statute from the
price affirmation statute in Brown-Forman as "contemporaneous" rather
than "prospective," but the practical effect of both statutes was the same.21
For example, in light of the Massachusetts beer-pricing statute, the
Connecticut statute had the impermissible effect of controlling
Massachusetts prices by forcing brewers to take into account their
Connecticut price when setting their Massachusetts price .2 18 Such an effect
would create "just the kind of competing and interlocking local economic
regulation that the Commerce Clause was meant to preclude.
219
With respect to the Maryland RPM prohibition, the statute regulates
evenhandedly and in the brick and mortar context should present none of
the problems identified in Brown-Forman and Healy. A manufacturer can
simply choose not to engage in RPM with Maryland brick and mortar
dealers. Moreover, the manufacturer should not need to consider the
Maryland statute when making decisions regarding use of RPM with out-
of-state brick and mortar dealers. The manufacturer is free, under the
Maryland RPM prohibition, to impose RPM on these out-of-state dealers.
In the internet context, however, the Maryland statute has the same
extraterritorial reach as did the state statutes in Brown-Forman and Healy.
If the manufacturer wishes to use RPM over the Internet in states where it
would be permissible, it must take into account the Maryland statute when
making those agreements.
It is virtually impossible for states to regulate content posted to the
Internet without having an extraterritorial reach "[b]ecause the internet [sic]
does not recognize geographic boundaries. " 20  In a series of cases
216. Healy, 491 U.S. at 326.
217. See id. at 335 (discussing the State's argument that the Connecticut law differed
materially from the New York law struck down in Brown-Forman).
218. See id. at 337-38 (discussing how the Connecticut law interacts with the current
Massachusetts price-affirmation law).
219. Id. at 3 37.
220. Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2003). While statutes
that seek to regulate content posted on the Internet have been summarily rejected by courts
as a violation of the Commerce Clause, state regulations of unsolicited commercial email or
spain have been upheld because the commercial emailer chooses between one recipient and
another by purposefully sending the emails. See Ferguson v. Friendfinders, 115 Cal. Rptr.
2d 258, 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that a California statute regulating spain did not
violate the Commerce Clause but it only applies when email is sent to a California resident
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involving state statutes that sought to regulate the dissemination of sexually
explicit content over the Internet, federal courts applied the Court's
reasoning in Brown-Forman and Healy to strike down the statutes as a
violation of the Commerce Clause.22 Once internet users post content to a
website, it is available to all users, and there is no way to prevent residents
of any particular state from accessing the post.222 As a result of the state
statute regulating the posted content, the out-of-state internet user must self-
223
censor or be subject to liability in the enacting state. The practical effect
of the statute, therefore, is to "subordinate the user's home state's policy. ..
to [the enacting state's] local concerns" by forcing internet users to stop
engaging in conduct that "may be legal in the state in which the user
acts ... [but would] subject the user to prosecution in [the enacting
state]. 2 24  Because the state statutes regulating content posted on the
Internet had the effect of regulating conduct outside of the enacting state,
the statutes had an impermissible extraterritorial reach in violation of the
Commerce Clause. 2
The Maryland RPM prohibition, as applied in the internet context, has
the same practical effect. The only way the manufacturer can avoid
liability under the Maryland antitrust laws is to abandon its RPM programs
with internet dealers in states where they would otherwise be permissible.
This effect is analogous to the situation in which an out-of-state internet
user must censor its posted content rather than risk liability under a
different state's internet regulation. The application of the Maryland RPM
by an email service with equipment in California); MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet,
Inc., 890 A.2d 818, 842-43 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (finding that a Maryland statute
regulating unsolicited commercial email did not violate the Commerce Clause because First
Choice made the "business decision" to purposefu~lly send emails to Maryland residents);
State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 412 (Wash. 2001) (finding that a Washington statute regulating
unsolicited commercial email did not violate the Commerce Clause because the statute only
addressed conduct of spamnmers in targeting Washington residents).
221. See Dean, 342 F.3d at 102-04 (using the Court's reasoning in Healy and Brown-
Forman to analyze a state statute regulating sexually explicit content posted on the Internet);
Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 173-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same).
222. See Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 167 (noting that once an internet user
posts infornation to the Internet, it is virtually impossible to determine who has accessed the
content).
223. See id. at 174-75 (describing the only way that an internet user located outside of
New York can post content to the Internet and avoid liability).
224. Id at 177.
225. See Dean, 342 F.3d at 104 (finding that the Vermont law regulating content on the
Internet violated the Commerce Clause because it directly regulated commerce in other
States): Am. Libraries Ass n, 969 F. Supp. at 177 (finding that because the New York statute
regulated conduct occurring outside the State's borders, it violated the Commerce Clause).
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prohibition to the Internet, therefore, has the effect of "subordinat~ing]"
other states' antitrust policies to Maryland's "local concerns" by forcing
manufacturers to stop engaging in conduct that "may be legal in the state in
which the [manufacturer] acts .. . [but would] subject the [manufacturer] to
prosecution in [Maryland] . 226  The Court in Brown-Forman and Healy
made it clear that a state regulation cannot have the practical effect of
forcing an out-of-state entity to take into account another state's regulatory
regime when setting its prices. As applied to the Internet, the Maryland
RPM prohibition has this precise effect and therefore has an impermissible
extraterritorial reach.
2. The Intent of the Legislature
The second tenet of an extraterritorial analysis is that the intent of the
legislature is irrelevant when a state statute directly controls transactions
occurring wholly outside the state's borders. 2 The issue is "whether the
practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the
boundaries of the State.",228  While the Maryland Attorney General or a
private plaintiff might argue that Maryland has a legitimate state interest in
providing its residents with the lowest prices possible, 2 the intent of the
Maryland General Assembly is irrelevant .230  The Maryland RPM
prohibition has the practical effect of regulating conduct occurring wholly
outside the state and thus has an impermissible extraterritorial reach,
regardless of the state's legitimate local purpose.
3. Complying with Inconsistent Regulations
Finally, an extraterritorial analysis must "consider[] how the
challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of
226. Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 177.
227. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) ("Second. a statute that directly
controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent
limits of the enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's
extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature.").
228. Id.
229. See DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS. OF MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, FISCAL AND POLICY
NOTE: H.B. 657, H. 426, 2009 Sess. (2009) (discussing the policy concerns underlying the
amendment to the Maryland antitrust laws).
230. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (noting that the intent of the legislature is irrelevant if
the state statute directly regulates commerce occurring wholly outside the State).
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other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State
adopted similar legislation. 3 1  Considering how vocal state attorneys
general have been about the Court's decision in Leggin, 3 2 it is appropriate
to assume that there will be proposed legislation mirroring the Maryland
RPM prohibition in many other states. When deciding whether the
Maryland RPM prohibition has an impermissible extraterritorial reach, it is
important, therefore, to consider how similar legislation in other states
might affect the application of the Maryland statute.
In Healy, the concern was that other states might pass legislation
similar to the Connecticut contemporaneous price-affirmation statute. The
effect would be a "price gridlock" on a national scale if states passed state
price-affirmation statutes that "linked in-state prices to the lowest price in
any State in the country. 233  The federal government has the right to
regulate prices nationally under the Commerce Clause; thus, national
regulation of pricing cannot "be accomplished piecemeal through the
extraterritorial reach of individual state statutes. 234  With respect to the
Maryland RPM prohibition as it applies to the Internet, the potential for
additional state legislation regulating RPM agreements midght create a
similar "price gridlock" that would force manufacturers to comply with the
strictest state regulation to avoid liability in other states.
In a series of cases in which former professional athletes attempted to
use state antitrust statutes to challenge league practices, 235 the state antitrust
laws, as applied to professional sports leagues, were struck down as a
violation of the Commerce Clause. If state regulation of professional sports
leagues was permissible, "the internal structure of the leagues would require
compliance with the strictest state antitrust standard. 23 6 If state antitrust
regulation "requires the enterprise to comply with the strictest standard of
several states in order to continue an interstate business extending over
many states, the extra-territorial effect which the application of a particular
23 1. Id.
232. See Mitnick, supra note 93, at 63 (describing how the state attorneys general have
reacted to the Leegin opinion).
233. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 340 (1989).
2 34. Id.
235. See Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 265 (2d Cir. 1971) (examining the plaintiff's
attack on baseball's reserve system); Robertson v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867,
873-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (discussing the plaintiffs' antitrust claims against the National
Basketball Association); Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674, 676 (Cal.
1983) (discussing Partee's claim that five of the National Football League's operating rules
violated state antitrust laws).
236. Flood, 443 F.2d at 268.
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state law would exact constiutes ... an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce." 237  At least one author has expressly stated that these cases
apply to state regulation of the Internet. 3 The Internet, like a professional
sports league, operates across all states, and if various state regulations have
the effect of forcing an internet user to comply with the strictest state
regulation, there are Commerce Clause implications.
If internet users are subject to varying state internet regulations,
compliance will be "effectively impossible if they are to engage in interstate
commerce." 239 Because content posted on the Internet is accessible to users
in every state, internet users will be forced to comply with the strictest state
regulation when posting content to the Internet. Currently, because
Maryland is the only state that expressly prohibits RPM agreements under
its antitrust laws, manufacturers must comply with the Maryland statute in
all of their transactions involving the Internet. If other states pass similar
laws that fall short of prohibiting RPM agreements, the manufacturer will
still be forced to comply with the Maryland statute. Even if other states
pass statutes that mirror the Maryland statute, there will still be
impermissible extraterritorial effects because the manufacturer will have to
abandon its RPM programs in states where they would be permissible.
"This kind of potential regional and even national regulation of the pricing
mechanism for goods" is the exclusive field of the federal government and
cannot be accomplished using piecemeal state legislation. 
240
VI. Towards a Uniform Standard
The Maryland RPM prohibition's effect on interstate commerce
reveals a pressing concern about the role of federalism in the antitrust
context. Influenced by the concept of "dual federalism," the framers of the
Sherman Act did not intend to "displace all state regulation of the
economy, 041anths designed the Sherman Act to supplement rather than
supersede existing state antitrust regulations. 4 Over time, however,
237. Id. at 267.
238. See LANGER, supra note 135, at 6 (discussing how the professional sports league
cases could be used to evaluate state regulations of RPM agreements and the Internet).
239. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 186, at 807.
240. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 340 (1989).
241. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 627, 627
(2006).
242. See 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890) (discussing the underlying policy objectives of the
Sherman Act).
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federal law has surpassed state law as the predominant source of antitrust
law, and it has become increasingly unclear what role state antitrust laws
should have in a national economy.243  The Maryland RPM prohibition's
extraterritorial reach suggests that the role of state antitrust laws should be
limited at the national level.
By prohibiting conduct that might be permissible under federal law,
the Maryland RPM prohibition has made it impossible for manufacturers to
develop a national business plan. Manufacturers must adapt their dealer
agreements to comply with different standards, increasing transaction costs
and disrupting efficient use of the national economy. Failure to comply
with the varying standards will result in "magnifjied] and protract~ed]"
uncertainty in litigation and increased litigation costs.24 Thereshudba
uniform standard applicable at the state and federal level, so businesses can
operate throughout the United States with relative certainty that their
actions comply with the law.
Senator Herb Kohl has twice introduced a bill that would align federal
law with the Maryland RPM prohibition, creating a uniform standard under
which businesses could develop a national business plan.24 Senator Kohl's
bill would amend the Sherman Act to restore application of the per se rule
to RPM.246 Both Senator Kohl's bill and the Maryland RPM prohibition act
as a blunt instrument, however, condemning conduct with potential
procompetitive, as well as anticompetitive effects. Because Leggin
identified procompetitive effects associated with RPM, any uniform
standard should attempt to protect procompetitive uses of RPM from per se
illegal treatment.
Congress should enact legislation that would serve as a uniform
standard under which businesses could develop procompetitive RPM
programs. To avoid inconsistency at the state level, such legislation should
expressly preempt state legislative attempts to deviate from the federal
standard. The proposed legislation should try to incorporate the three
243. See generally Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, 26
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 877 (2003).
244. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940
(2001).
245. See Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 148, 111 th Cong. (1 st Sess.
2009) (restoring the rule that RPM agreements violate the Sherman Act); Discount Pricing
Consumer Protection Act, S. 226 1, 110Oth Cong. (1 st Sess. 2007) (same).
246. See Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 148, 111 th Cong. ("To restore
the rule that agreements between manufacturers and retailers, distributors, or wholesalers to
set the minimum price below which the manufacturer's product or service cannot be sold
violates the Sherman Act.").
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factors identified in Leegin as markers of anticompetitive uses of RPM.
247
For example, Congress could amend the Sherman Act to expressly prohibit
vertical price restraints instigated by dealers or by manufacturers with
significant market power.24 This type of nuanced approach would serve
the policy objectives identified in Leegin and would provide a uniform
standard to which manufacturers could comply at the national level.
VII. Conclusion
If the Maryland Attorney General or a private plaintiff sues a
manufacturer whose product subject to RPM is sold over the Internet to a
Maryland consumer, the manufacturer should be able to defend successfully
by claiming that the Maryland RPM prohibition is unconstitutional. While
it is unlikely that Leegin's interpretation of § 1 of the Sherman Act
preempts the Maryland RPM prohibition, the Maryland statute violates the
dormant Commerce Clause. Because manufacturers cannot comply with
the Maryland RPM prohibition unless they abandon RPM programs in
states where they would otherwise be permissible, the Maryland RPM
prohibition regulates conduct outside Maryland and in doing so, violates the
dormant Commerce Clause.
Besides violating the dormant Commerce Clause, the Maryland RPM
prohibition is problematic because it substantively differs from Leegin's
interpretation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Congress should develop a
uniform standard applicable at the state and federal level, so attorneys can
work with manufacturers to develop a national business model that
complies with the antitrust laws.
247. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 897-98
(2007) (discussing three factors that could help a lower court apply the rule of reason to
vertical price restraints).
248. See id (discussing the dangers associated with RPM initiated by dealers and by
manufacturers with market power).
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